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Calvin Mooers's Law has long been one of my favorites. I often use it as an
excuse for irrational behavior in library management. Over twenty years
ago, Calvin Mooers commented: "An information retrieval system will
tend not to be used whenever it is more painful and troublesome for a
customer to have information than for him not to have it." 1
Mooers was involved with information storage and retrieval systems
in science, but his words are just as appropriate for management informa-
tion systems (MIS). The problem with having information in Mooer's view
is that you can't just let it sit there if it indicates that something must be
done. If that something is hard to do or involves difficult social consequen-
ces (such as disrupting the faculty's habits of library use, or the student's
timing of meeting his date), it will only cause ulcers, sleepless nights or
unemployment if you don't make the adjustment. Of course there is one
way to avoid all of the trouble, and that is not to have the information in
the first place.
If Mooers's Law is right, then managers and administrators should
reject management information systems. Yet here one is, deliberating
positively on the future of such systems presumably enhanced to new levels
of capabilities by the computer. Well, I suppose that's all right, for in spite
of Mooers's Law or anything I might say, human nature makes one
inquisitive so that counting things and arraying the tally in various
displays comes with his genes.
But Mooers's Law alone is not sufficient. I have discovered Russell's
inference: "If there are two things to be counted, that which is the easiest
will cost the most to tally." Then there is Shank's syndrome: "If you count
one of two things the boss will want the other." This is followed closely by
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the invariable derivation: "That which the boss wants is the most ambigu-
ous to define, the most expensive to count, but the most relevant to him."
And we have the petulant ukase: Never wait for the information do it
now and then gather data to prove you had the right idea but the "system"
subverted the purity of your solution and for irrelevant reasons. Or the
invariable proposition: The sum of the columns is never equal to the sum
of the footings. Or the perfect postulate: Don't just stand there count!
Why do we collect data which can be turned into management infor-
mation? Well, there can be many reasons:
1 . The data might be worth something. The choice of tasks among several
alternatives for the use of one's time, assuming that the utility of the
alternatives is the same, might be clearly indicated by the data which
shows how much resource would be required to perform each task.
2. We collect some data to sustain tradition. For fifty years research li-
braries have been reporting the size of their holdings and it has now
become a ritual to contribute to the ARL census. Some await the report
eagerly which year by year shows them bobbing up and down amongst
their peers in a variety of measurable elements. About the best I can say
of it is that it might sustain some ego gratification. Unless one is a
Harvard graduate there is always something to aim at. Or one can take
pleasure or not about the company he's in.
3. Some collecting is done just because the data is there. It is human nature
to sort things into piles, and to wander idly over the field counting
things as one goes.
4. Some data is collected so as to avoid embarrassment. Someone'mightask
questions about the operations which can best be answered with
numbers. What manager would be considered qualified for the job if he
or she couldn't tell how much of anything goes into or comes out of the
operation. There is, of course, a certain peace of mind which is derived
from collecting data, even if no one ever asks about it. At least one has
data which can be used in press releases.
5. There is, of course, the great public demand for accountability. Since
most of the public does not have the faith any more to believe the litanies
of those who spend public money, they need data to explain the use of
public money. We may snow them with numbers, but at least the
appearance of precision on our part will give the appearance that we
think we know what we are doing and we're doing it for them!
6. Sometimes data is collected in order to create tables and reports to over-
whelm the administration. Perhaps this is just another form of account-
ability. But busy administrators don't need more information (which by
the way might be accurate and painful to deal with). What one actually
finds is that less and less data is forwarded through the organization
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since less and less is read or heeded. From one standpoint, therefore, the
function of an organization seems to be to suppress data. What is often
lacking is a distinction between data which contains information to
control processes at the local level, and data which explains the reason
for, or the need for, decisions on resource allocation to the next level.
The same data does not always provide the foundation for the extraction
of information needed at each level. Hence the need to stratify the
management information system to match the management levels in an
organization. This would tend to make the notion of a standard set of
data to be gathered for the whole organization irrational. Furthermore,
the higher one goes in an organization, the more difficult it is to predict
what issues have to be handled, hence the more difficult it is to predict
management's need for information.
7. Data is collected so that those who give it those who are doing the
work think that managers know what's going on and care. There are
many signals which can be given after they get the data which will
sustain this impression. Part of the art of management is giving signals.
8. Data is collected because we cannot lose by doing it. Institutions assess
no penalties on departments including management information
departments for collecting too much data. Data gathering is seldom
priced, hence the evaluation of management information systems is
seldom based on the economics of running the systems. Management
requires data which it assumes can be gathered easily in the course of
doing the tasks being counted, and that takes us back to the human
nature theory of data gathering.
Just as there is no penalty for collecting too much data, there is no
premium on brevity of data collection. Information management
departments or systems are not judged on the basis of the value of the
decisions which could be based on the information in the data they
gather. Managers further up in the hierarchy are judged on the quality
of their decisions, which could possibly be based on information from a
management information system, but which does not necessarily need
to be. The whole system seems to be put into place as a perpetual motion
machine all too often installed without there being any analysis of what
to do with the data.
Now for any and all of these reasons, and probably more, we collect
and report data. But a typical administrative characteristic seems to be the
appearance of ignoring irrefutable information derived from good data.
This is particularly true in the political arena. There the black and white of
logic is overwhelmed by back scratching and other heuristic devices. Most
of our political and some of our administrative behavior seems to be based
on a sample of one preferably apocryphal incident.
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If we are so good why is our data rejected up the line? My inventory of
reasons is long and sound, based on many years both as a producer of data
about operations, and as a manager whose primary functions seems to be
finding reasons why managers, administrators and politicians reject data.
This may occur because:
1. It is not clear what, if anything, can be done about whatever the data
purports to show. Here I have reworded Mooers's Law. Management
information will be rejected to the extent that it indicates that some-
thing has to be done. Fewer managers have been fired for doing nothing
than for trying something.
2. Rejection may occur because the data is not trusted. One way to reject a
whole report is to find one error in it. This error can be used to discredit
the whole report. Then the difficult decision can be avoided with
impugnity.
3. Rejection may occur if it is not clear if the data indicates something
good or something bad. Clear data, and good information, does little to
clarify ambiguous social conditions.
4. A corollary to the previous pronouncement is that data is rejected be-
cause those who present it do not have the theatrical skills required to
convince the hierarchy that it means anything.
5. Data is rejected because the recipient of the information is inclined to see
"the other side" of the issue. This is the side for which one did not gather
data. This is particularly true of social and political issues. The use of
this technique is one of the signs of the successful politician or
administrator.
6. Rejection may occur because the recipient has his own MIS which pro-
duces contrary data, or provides grounds for alternate inferences. This
produces enough ambiguity so that the manager or politican can dis-
play the wisdom of quick, seat-of-the-pants judgment. If the person has
been successful to date (that's why he or she is in the management
position), he or she will probably be right again.
7. Data is rejected because there is no way to match the data from different
but related departments or situations. This moves us again into the
arena of ambiguity and the need for a carefully designed, stratified
management information system.
8. Data rejection occurs because there is a lack of understanding along the
way as to what data and information will sustain decisions about the
value of services. This is either the result of a manager's inability to
direct the enterprise by thinking of scenarios for a possible future, or a
lack of empathy for the manager's problems by those down the line.
Lack of empathy may short-circuit as many upwardly mobile people as
it does the data they provide.
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Perhaps I can be a bit more sanguine about management information
systems with the involvement of computers. Obviously if data storage and
retrieval is the name of the game, computers are ideally suited to this
function. They can tally and summarize and they can work fast. If the
summaries can be made hierarchical, just like the organization, then
computers can take over the screening (or data suppression) function but
with a difference. With a computer and the right software, the manager can
get not only his or her own compressed summary data, but at any time go
into the file and see anyone's data should the fancy strike him.
But I worry. Data system operators tell me that the cost of storage is
coming down rapidly has been for years. What this means is that it will
not cost so much on a unit basis to store the garbage; so for the money, we
can store more. But all that we will then have is cheaper garbage.
Computers have still another advantage. They can count the transac-
tions as they work on them. No longer does someone have to tally the
number of circulation cards at the end of the day, or the orders sent out, or
the number of items processed. Programmed correctly, the computer will
do the counting as it goes. Just look at the number on the bottom line. If
nothing else, this is a labor saver.
To me the chief advantage of the computer, though, is that it can
economically work on the "what if" questions. These are the ones that
managers like to ask, but usually cannot get answered because there is no
way to test all of the variables in order to substantiate answers without
operating on the patient (the library or its users) without an anesthetic.
The "what if" questions I am thinking of are operational. Adminis-
trators may ponder notions such as: What if we closed seven of the branches
two hours earlier each day, paid the staff to travel to a regional installation
for the remaining time, beefed up the reference staff for half the hours lost,
and added 25 percent to the budget of the book delivery system? What
would be the differential cost (excess or saved), and what would be the effect
on service (given some reasonable measures of service output of the
library)? This is not the kind of question that can be answered with
assurance. The hot, highly successful managers might be able to handle it.
After all, they are hot and highly successful because they have the intuition,
the experience, or the ability to make their analyses sound good, which
leads them to answer questions while dodging issues.
But in the main they tread gingerly take one step at a time try to
find those things which can be done relatively cheaply, and which do not
involve an intolerable sunk cost. If we have to retreat we at least want to do
it gracefully and cheaply.
The computer could handle all of the data for the mix of options we
would like to test if only. And here is the crux of the issue of making the
computer a real management ally. One could do it best if only he had good
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models of the library as an operating organism, and lots of data about the
units of operation in the system. Then he could run libraries as models
with different variables, look at paper outputs and do it all without
disturbing current operations. Then one could make decisions if he had
confidence and a lot of courage. Intuition and experience might still be the
sine qua non of the administrator, but now the data output by the manage-
ment information system would be in the context of the management
questions.
Modeling and collecting a large volume of operational data would
then make some sense. The work of people such as Hamburg, Kantor and
King are steps in this direction. So is that of those who have done the many
user studies. But their work only provides proofs of the utility of the
process. They show the way to analyze problems and to count data. What
we need to do now is to build models of library operations. And the data to
be inserted in them must be specific to the library being analyzed. But
beware of the monster we might create. According to the Wall Street
Journal the major computer centers in the United States produced over 240
billion pages of printout in 1980 about 1000 pages forevery man, woman
and child. This number could grow to 10,000 pages per person by 1985 at
.
o
the rate we are going.
Wildavsky said that: "Alas, access to data does not automatically
convert itself into information. Inference and interpretation are
required."
3 This is where administrative talent (whether based on intui-
tion or experience) must come to the fore. It cannot be replaced by the
computer. It could even be stymied by receiving thousands of pages, or
even thousands of lines, of data. Even computer graphics which coordinate
and display data in compact and different ways might not help. Some users
are visually illiterate. Here it may be well to note an even deeper issue. Not
only is there widespread visual illiteracy, but also there may be an even
greater antipathy if not illiteracy to mathematics. If computers lead to
an increase in quantitative reports we might expect an even greater rejec-
tion of the output of MIS by administrators and politicians. Unless we can
improve peoples' ability in general to handle numbers, the rejection syn-
drome is likely to be reinforced.
Areas for concern when the computer is brought into MIS abound.
While the data storage costs per bit are coming down rapidly, Parkinson's
Law prevails. Data will expand to fill storage space and the total cost of
the system will go up both because it costs a lot to collect all of the data that
can be stored, and because the actual cost of the storage mechanism goes up
even though it densely packs in a lot more data with each machine
generation.
Both the power of the computer and the cost of using it might force us
at last to pay the kind of attention to management information systems and
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problems that has been notably lacking in our profession. We are
extremely cost conscious in every other aspect of library work. We establish
budgets for various phases of our operations. We seldom do it, however, for
management information systems. Budgets for management information
ought to be developed, and done so on the basis of the utility of the
information the systems can extract and give out. Or perhaps managers
should be given information budgets either in terms of cash they can
transfer to the management information system, or cash they can give for
information, or in terms of the time they are allowed to spend examining
data and information. (In a way, most administrators have a time budget.
Some management information systems output is rejected simply because
managers are enervated by merely seeing a pile of printout and wondering
where they will get the time to look at it.)
At last we may have the impetus to place heavier emphasis on the
education of managers to analyze and state issues in terms which will
suggest their information needs. And perhaps we can even learn to evaluate
administrators and managers for their ability to state issues and to make
inferences based on sound information derived from reliable and sensible
data. In this realm we are asking people to live symbolically. George Miller
of Princeton warns that: "More and more people will become useless if
they cannot live at the symbolic level."
4 The success of computer model-
ing, therefore, might well be proportional to the ability to live
symbolically.
We must, of course, recognize that the high technology of computers
does not mean that they are infallible. That is and this ought to be
obvious from what I have said so far people, not computers, solve prob-
lems. Neat columns, multi-inverted matrices, accurate tallies, quick eating
and consolidation of lots of data are not substitutes for intuition and
inference.
In case you missed it, here's where I have been. As a manager I am not
overwhelmingly enthusiastic about the utility of management informa-
tion systems up to now. I am skeptical about why we count, and I am not
certain we can see the way to use information derived from the data. We
have created reasons or perhaps just allowed human nature to take its
course to reject data. The computer, however, might finally get us nearer
Nirvana in the management information arena. A big task for the profes-
sion is to find ways to let the computer stimulate the organization under
different circumstances. Then maybe the manager's knowledge and intui-
tion will be supported with something more than faith.
But there is still work to do. The computer has to be fed and kept on
the right track. We could fail. I think of the story of the two men who were
cast adrift in a life boat in the cold North Atlantic Ocean. Just as they were
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about to take their last breaths, one looked up and said: "Praise the Lord,
we're saved. Here comes the Titanic."
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